



*The Missouri  
Committee  
for the  
Humanities, Inc.*

and



**william jewell college**

**A Special Conference on  
CHINESE ART AND CULTURE**

**Friday and Saturday  
May 9-10, 1975**

**Crown Center Hotel  
Kansas City, Missouri**

in connection with  
*The Exhibition of Archeological  
Finds of the People's Republic of  
China*  
*Nelson Gallery of Art*

**中华人民共和国出土文物展览**



# The Missouri Committee for the Humanities, Inc.

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## INTRODUCTION

ROBERT G. WALROND

The Missouri Committee for the Humanities, Inc. (MCH) is a private foundation that directs in Missouri the state-based program of the National Endowment for the Humanities. MCH provides financial support for programs that seek to apply the perspectives of the humanities to public policy issues.

When it became known that the Exhibition of Archeological Finds of the People's Republic of China would be held in Kansas City, the MCH felt it was appropriate to bring together Missourians to consider the value systems represented in the exhibition and their relationship with contemporary Chinese policy. Through the assistance of the Kansas Committee for the Humanities and the Oklahoma Humanities Committee, citizens of all these states were invited to this special conference.

On May 9 and 10, 1975 over 400 people — newspaper and television personnel, academic humanists, business people, civic leaders — gathered at the Crown Center Hotel in Kansas City for this special conference.

This souvenir booklet prints the major speeches of the conference. Dr. Laurence Sickman describes the exhibition. Senator Scott discusses the changing U.S. foreign policy in Asia. Dr. Ross Terrill analyzes Chinese value systems and their link with contemporary Chinese policy. Nancy Englander tells of NEH's goals for public programs. The speeches have been transcribed as given. They are not intended as scholarly articles, but we hope are happy recollections for those who attended this memorable event. Contributing their remarks are:

Dr. Thomas S. Field, President William Jewell College

Dr. Laurence Sickman, Director, William Rockhill Nelson Gallery — Atkins Museum of Fine Arts

The Honorable Hugh Scott, United States Senator from Pennsylvania

Dr. Ross Terrill, Associate Professor of Government, Harvard University

Ms. Nancy Englander, Assistant Director, Museums and Historical Organizations Program, National Endowment for the Humanities



## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

William Jewell College acted as funded agency for the project. The Crown Center Hotel provided an excellent meeting site. We are especially indebted to the Nelson Gallery for providing a private tour of the Exhibition. Dr. J. Gordon Kingsley, Associate Dean, William Jewell College was the Project Director. Mr. John W. Quinn, Shawnee Mission, Kansas was Public Relations Consultant.

All MCH members participated in planning and conducting the program. A special thanks goes to Dr. Seymour Smith and Dr. William Bondeson for moderating sessions of the program.

Dr. Georgia Bowman, William Jewell College, and Dr. Fred B. Goodwin, Southwest Missouri State University were Special Consultants to the project. Their insight and hard work made the conference a success.

An important part of the program was time spent in small group discussions. For the Missouri faculty members who gave of their time and effort to make these discussions valuable we are particularly grateful. These faculty members were:

Dr. Will Adams  
William Jewell College

Miss Margaret Alexander  
Jefferson College

Dr. Zenos Bicket  
Evangel College

Mr. Richard Boyt  
Crowder College

The Rev. Hillard Bro  
Rockhurst College

Mrs. Jayme Burchett  
School of the Ozarks

Dr. Lawrence Christensen  
University of Missouri-Rolla

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Northwest Missouri State  
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Dr. David Durham  
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Mr. Barry Ellis  
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The Reverend Maurice B. MacNamee, S.J. St. Louis University	Dr. Larry J. Roots Southwest Baptist College
Dr. John A. McCoy Longview Community College	Dr. Delbert F. Schaefer Missouri Southern College
Mr. James Mehl Missouri Western College	Dr. John D. Schaeffer Maple Woods Community College
Dr. Edmond Menges Florissant Valley Community College	Dr. Ann Marie Shannon William Jewell College
Dr. Richard Monson Central Missouri State University	Dr. Bill Stacy Southeast Missouri State University
Dr. Lawrence Nicholson Harris Teachers College	Dr. Patricia Stapleton Central Methodist College
Mr. Bill Oesterling Trenton Junior College	Dr. Norman Stewart Maryville College
Sr. Deborah Pearson Webster College	Dr. Gerrit ten Zythoff Southwest Missouri State University
Dr. Arnold Perris University of Missouri- Saint Louis	Dr. Hans W. Uffelman University of Missouri- Kansas City
Dr. Louis W. Potts University of Missouri- Kansas City	Mrs. Edithe West Drury College
Dr. Jack L. Ralston University of Missouri- Kansas City	Dr. Charles Wiles Southeast Missouri State University
Dr. John David Rice William Jewell College	Dr. Lance Williams University of Missouri-Rolla

We also would like to thank Mr. William Bahn, whose photographs are contained in this book.







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## WELCOME

THOMAS S. FIELD

... We are here, therefore, not only for a conference, but also for a celebration. We celebrate examples of what the poet W. B. Yeats called "monuments of an aging intellect." We celebrate what the minds and spirits, the hearts and hands, of people long ago and far away have created of themselves. So we celebrate their humanity, and as their heart speaks to us, we affirm our own. I sincerely hope that these are hours of great profit for you. Our speakers are the best the nation has to offer. The exhibition is nearly unique in the United States, being shown only in Kansas City and one other locale. So again I say, welcome and again I say how pleased William Jewell College is to make yet another contribution to the artistic life of our region and our nation. Thank you very much for coming.



Fred Goodwin, MCH Chairman, introduces Dr. Field.





Hugh Scott, Fred Goodwin, Laurence Sickman, Thomas Field confer before Dr. Sickman's speech.



## A DESCRIPTION OF THE CHINESE COLLECTION

LAURENCE SICKMAN

Senator Scott, President Field, ladies and gentlemen. I brought those slides with me this afternoon to illustrate the great collections of the Nelson Gallery because you're going to see it, hopefully, tomorrow at a rather early hour, say 8 o'clock in the morning. Although no reproductions, no slides, can in any way compare with the original objects, you will have an opportunity to see this extraordinary exhibition of the archaeological finds of the People's Republic of China.

I might say just a word about how this exhibition came about. Since the founding of the People's Republic in 1949, there has been an extraordinarily active archaeological program initiated. It has come about in two ways. One is an actually planned program of archaeological digs at famous sites, excavation of well-known tombs, etc. Another part has been very gratuitous with the development of dams, roads, etc. And excavation today works with construction as they have come across or broken into tombs of the past. In most cases the work is stopped, the archaeological dean of the college of the locality is called in, and work is not resumed until the archaeologist is satisfied that they have completed the excavation. So a remarkable type of exhibition has resulted. You can go to the Nelson Gallery, Community Gallery, Boston Museum, and see wonderful works of Chinese art. But the one unique quality of this exhibition is that everything has been recovered under carefully controlled scientific conditions so that it is a selection made from the archaeological finds where they know precisely the conditions under which it was found, the objects associated with it, so that you can build a kind of cultural picture of a particular era, a particular locality.

The Chinese archaeologists themselves and other high officials connected with such matters have selected 384 objects ranging in date from around 600,000 B.C. down to around the middle of the 14th century. The exhibition was made official in Paris in 1973 and immediately stirred up an enormous amount of interest in the western world and since then it was shown in London, Vienna, Stockholm, Toronto, the National Gallery in Washington, and finally here in Kansas City.

Now, I don't know why it's come to Kansas City, frankly. I think we recognize that perhaps the museum knows a little bit about installation and so on. But, I'll read a passage to you from the protocol agreement that came from the Chinese Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China to the Honorable George Bush in which he says, "When Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President of the United States of America on National Security Affairs, was on a visit to the People's Republic of China in February, 1973, he expressed to the Chinese government the hope that the exhibition of archaeological finds from the People's Republic of China would be held in the United States. I have the honor to inform your excellency that, with a view to promoting understanding and friendship between the Chinese and American peoples, the Chinese government is agreeable to the holding of this exhibition at the National Gallery of Art in Washington, D.C. and the Nelson Gallery of Art in Kansas City, Missouri from December 8, 1974 to June 7, 1975." Now, I didn't hear anything about this until March of that year when a call from the State Department told us that we had been selected of all the museums that were contending for this exhibition, and this came as quite a surprise. Being a prudent man and the director of an impecunious institution I immediately thought of the financial impact of an exhibition of this scale and staggering proportions. I'm happy to say that the National Endowment for the Humanities came to the rescue gallantly and the exhibition would certainly not be here were it not for their interest. I feel that, probably, the Chinese and the State Department Committee felt that it would be wise to show this at a central location in the United States where it would not be simply seen on the eastern seaboard or the



western seaboard but would be seen in the heart of America, and that is my personal reason for feeling that we were selected and the exhibition is here. We actually didn't know what we were getting into when we contracted, more or less, to show the exhibition. In the first place we had to put on 24 extra guards because the security is extremely high — there are all manner of security regulations. The Chinese curators, four curators and a translator, are with the exhibition all the while. The installation is extremely complex. We were able to get about 18,000 square feet which meant that we had to denude all of our western painting galleries for the opening of the central hall. The cases are complicated. They have to be airtight and there's very close control of the humidity and temperature. And the thing is built in a very complex maze so that once you get in you are very definitely guided through. The special way it was made, which I think has worked out extremely well, was designed and constructed by Mark Wilson and Hugh Edward.

Now, let's treat the exhibition. It is arranged and divided into 34 separate units. It's not an art exhibition. In an art exhibition objects are selected for their particular beauty, their particular aesthetic quality, and they are shown in the way and in relationship to one another where they will appear to their best artistic merit and the best advantage of each. Rather, this exhibition is designed with a selection of objects to illustrate the flow of Chinese cultural history over a period of some 600,000 years from the first chips of the pre-Neolithic period down to the high-fired porcelains of the 14th century. Now along the way, as you go through, of course you will come across some masterpieces of artistic merit. But they are illustrative of the cultural heights and tastes and knowledge and technical capabilities of the period they represent. Each one of these 34 units illustrates a phase or aspect of Chinese material culture. There are excellent wall labels, maps and charts to help guide you through the maze, through the exhibition. In other words, it's a truly didactic exhibition. You begin at the beginning and you come out at the middle of the 14th century. So, for example, the first unit is the Paleolithic age of Lantian Man or early forms of Peking Man, early humanoids, and the last units 33 and 34, cover the 14th century Yuan Dynasty Capital Tatu excavation at modern Peking and the artifacts of the period. There are many ways to view this exhibition, go through it, and many ways to see it. I might mention two extremes. That is, you can look at it completely out of context or you can try and put these objects into context to the extent that your knowledge of Asia will allow.

In the first place, out of context, you can look at the exhibition just as current objects of contemporary values. You can judge them purely on their shape, their form, their decoration, the technique, and enjoy them, certainly, as current objects for the dilettantism of the spirit. You will find this a very rich and very rewarding experience. For example, when you get into the late Neolithic, you will notice how extraordinarily beautiful the stone tools are, the stone implements, stone axes and hatchets, and these would have a particular meaning today to us who are so much conditioned for the appreciation of abstract art. And we'll see that they have really worked on these stone tools in order to make them beautiful, to make them beautifully proportioned and with a proper texture. So, you can enjoy them simply for their immediate appearance. But, as I say, this is not merely an artistic exhibition and viewing it in context means why was this thing made, what purpose did it serve, what function did it have in society at the time and the cultural level in which it was made. What aspect of the social cultural patterns determined it and its form and material and what determined its origin? That is, all objects are not made to go on a grand piano. They're made for very specific needs, very specific purposes. Of course, I've been through the exhibition many times and I've found one interesting way to enjoy it is to begin with the Paleolithic, the Lantian Man and the Peking Man, and there you'll see some very roughly chipped things and a stone with a few chips knocked off of it and I think for many of you it will be rather dull and uninteresting. But stop and think. This rock is 600,000 years old and those chips are the beginning of technology, and to follow the exhibition through with the idea of the evolution



of technology fitting different needs, different purposes, makes it particularly meaningful. Lantian Man was around 600,000 years ago.

We come now another 100,000 years to around 50 to 400,000 B.C. and here's Peking Man still chipping the same old flints 100,000 years later, but he has discovered the use of fire and you'll see there a section of the floor of a Peking Man's cave which has burned. The use of fire was another advance in technology. And then we jump really hundreds of thousands of years until you get to the late Neolithic. Now, what goes on in between it's very difficult to say.

Around 4000, maybe 5000, B.C., the late Neolithic period, one comes to the beautifully finished stone implements where there is definitely a sense of beauty in the making and some of the finest Neolithic pottery in the world. At this time man is living a communal life, these Neolithic villages were communes of a sort. They were farmers, the lands were farmed in common, they had common storage bins in the village, common kilns for the making of pottery. And maybe one reason why the People's Republic of China is particularly interested in the excavation of these late Neolithic sites is it apparently was a communal life of a certain amount of peace and happiness.

A marvelous thing that happened was the discovery of bronze, the discovery of casting of bronze into objects. This, of course, probably changed the whole picture. The people who could control bronze casting methods, could certainly very easily overcome a group of men with stone axes or chipped arrow heads. And so there grows up the princely state of Shang, and from that time on, probably for hundreds and thousands of years, what we saw passing is the enormous rate of acceleration of technology. Once there was established village life, then the city state of Shang, and the casting of bronzes, and it moves at an enormous rate. How much advancement took place? You see in the room of Shang bronzes some of the most beautiful bronzes ever cast. These were cast by a process of molds and there's no technique for casting bronze today that can cast so perfectly as these beautiful bronzes were done. You've also noticed if you've glanced at the labels, and I'm very happy to see that you have catalogues, you'll see that a number of these bronzes are inscribed with the dedication to specific ancestors. The vessel was used in a ceremonial way for offering to the spirits of the ancestors and this points out the importance of the clan.

The momentum moves on to a number of bronzes of various periods and one comes to around the year 700 B.C. when this old city state system begins to break up and there are many contending feudal states. The bronze vessels now change their shape all together, change their form. Why? Because the social order has changed. The religious ideas have changed. China now has all these contending feudal states. They're contending for power, but they're also contending for luxuries, display, show, and the new technique comes in that answers this demand for luxury and show, and that is the gilding and inlaying of bronzes with silver. We see some of them are tremendously inlaid, bronzes and gold with silver. This process makes them more ornate, baroque, more exuberant. There's a big doorknocker that is one of the great big examples of late bronzes created in the warring states. There are some wonderful examples of objects from this period.

And then you find some of the very impressive tombs like the tomb of Liu Sheng, Prince Ching of Chungshan, and his wife Tou Wan. These tombs were discovered quite gratuitously, completely untouched, unlooted, only a few years ago south of Peking. And the Prince Liu Sheng was the half brother of the then ruling emperor so he was very close to the imperial clan and buried around 15 B.C. An inventory of his tomb illustrates marvelously the wealth and power of the Han empire, which was the first really great empire of China, and that is where the famous Jade Suit comes from which you will see and the many, many wine vessels, great huge wine pots, inlaid with gold and silver. From the same tomb, of course, come the famous bronze leopards which are probably among the smallest things in the exhibition, certainly a public favorite, and some of the most beautiful. And we come to the big procession of bronze horses of which the famous Flying Horse is a part, and this all comes from a



tomb in the very western most part of China in what is now Kansu Province, and this was the tomb of a general and these chariots and soldiers, iron soldiers and so on, are symbolic in this sense of the power of the Chinese empire and its expansion across central Asia.

Incidentally, I just might explain very briefly what these tomb figures are. In the first room you come into the bronze figures and you'll see photographs of a tomb, the vernacular tomb of the Tung period, with the excavation down in the center of the tomb and all around the edge are dozens of skeletons. These were the retainers and the guards, the favorites of the defunct potentate who's buried there, and they all went into the tomb with him. Also, there are enormous pits of horse burials where the horses and chariots and the charioteers had all accompanied the deceased into the spirit world. Well, this was inhumane and also economically unsound to bury all these horses and chariots and so there came about what one might call synthetic magic or substitution burial. Since things were only intended to serve in the spirit world, the only thing they had to do was catch the spirit of them either in bronze or wood or clay. That is, if by modeling in clay you catch the spirit, the horsiness of horses, that model would serve a potentate just as well in the next world as if he were buried with his favorite pacer. So that as you go through, notice the variety of these tomb figurines because they will tell you a great deal of Chinese social life.

But there are many things of this type and you should stop and think about them and look to see what they mean. The Han dynasty which, as I said, was the great supreme period of Chinese material culture, is represented in vessels in gold and silver, beautiful ceramics, silks from central Asia, and they show quite accurately the culture at the end of the 14th century, and our exploration of technology in one sense comes to an end there.

Now, Cicero once went on a trip around the Mediterranean and when he got back he made the report to the Senate of Rome and it seems he built a museum in Carthage, and he said some of the things were worth seeing but most of them it's quite enough just to hear about them. In this exhibition everything is worth seeing. And no matter how you go through it, from what point of view, whether you spend one hour or three hours, I'm sure that the viewers cannot help but be deeply impressed by the continuity, the genius, the achievements of the Chinese people and their civilization which, incidentally, is the oldest surviving culture of our world today. Thank you.



## THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ART AND THE VALUE SYSTEM OF A CULTURE

HUGH SCOTT



Hugh Scott

Dr. Goodwin, Dr. Field, Dr. Sickman, all you non-doctors in the audience, ladies and gentlemen. I am delighted, first of all, to be in Kansas City and, of course, to have one more opportunity to see this sublime collection. I had that privilege in China and twice in Washington, once for the ceremonial opening when I could see nothing but the people who asked me lobbying questions and the second time I went there to really see it and enjoy it by myself.

I saw Dr. Sickman last week, by the way, since he and I are both on the Visiting Committee for the Freer Gallery and I appreciate what he said about my favorite senator, Cicero, whom I often quote, especially when I can say as he did about someone that he "deserved well of the republic," a famous Ciceronian tribute. But I think what you said about Carthage is also true of the Senate. Some Senators are worth seeing but as to the others it's quite enough to hear about them.

The occasion of our meeting is, of course, the discussion and showing of this very magnificent exhibition and to have this conference serve as a sort of bridge, as Dr. Goodwin remarked to me, between the exhibition itself and the newly opening relationship between the United States and the

People's Republic of China. Some of this art was created, as you were told, many years before this new world of ours was discovered, and I think it's appropriate to remind ourselves that ours was a new world as well to the peoples of Asia.

Dr. Sickman is too modest to tell you his own relationship to the reason why the exhibition is here. I'm not too modest to tell you even though it involves some participation of my own. But you will forget, I hope, what I said as to my part in it and remember only Dr. Sickman's. The story is inextricable, however, and he does know a part of it because I told him last week. Senator Mansfield, however, and I visited China in April and May of 1972 and I carried three requests to Chou En Lai of a cultural nature. I urged him to invite the Philadelphia orchestra, and representing a state which has two ends I quickly added on the Pittsburgh Symphony, and I also suggested to him a suggestion that he had heard before from Dr. Kissinger, I am sure, and heard since then from others, that he permit a part of this great exhibition of their recent discoveries to come to the United States, to Washington specifically. As Larry can tell you, we never got a direct answer from our Chinese friends, but if they say as much as "We will consider it" you are sometimes half way home. And that's what happened. You know the Philadelphia Orchestra did get there and I'm still busy explaining that to the Pittsburgh Symphony. I'm trying to get the Pittsburgh Symphony's branch of the woodwinds group barreled up and down the Ohio River on a barge included in the bicentennial as a sort of consolation prize. In any event, what happened very shortly thereafter was that the question arose as to whether the Chinese would send this exhibition over here, and the President, whose support of art was very considerable, said, "I hope they'll be willing to show it in some places other than Washington." And he said to me, "What about the Midwest?" And I have to tell you the truth, and I hope there's nobody here from Chicago, because he said to me, "I think I'll recommend Chicago." And I said, "Mr. President, I wish you wouldn't because



Kansas City has not only a magnificent museum but it has Dr. Lawrence Sickman who, as the curator, could do justice by this exhibition." And then reaching grandly beyond that I said, "If it's coming to the midwest I hope on the way home they'll stop in San Francisco, perhaps at the de Jong museum." There was no promise that this would be done and the original agreement did not include, as I understand it, Kansas City. But the Chinese operate a good deal like elephants making love. There's a great deal of noise but nothing happens for quite a long time afterwards, so that I didn't learn until much more recently that they did finally consider Kansas City, and I don't know whether any of the earlier conversation was related to that or not. But I know that nobody told Chicago about what we were saying about Kansas City, so if I get to Chicago I've got a lot of explaining to do.

In any event, I do stress the fact that it was the kind of museum and kind of curator you have which led to that selection, almost casual, almost off-handed on the part of the President who really was not caring a great deal about it simply because his interest didn't run in that direction. But I was glad to be a sort of proxy for you. I would also recommend to this President that the next national convention of our party be held in Kansas City. I'm serious about it. I don't know whether it will or not but if I claim to have had a part in the past I can admit trying to have a part in the future and if it works then you can give me credit and then you'll believe both stories.

Well, to return to our subject, I think it's seeing so many interesting objects of the development of the civilization by people who were putting together a series of ascending, and at times descending, civilizations, the opportunity to admire the great tectonic talent of some of these masterworks, which suggests to us how much we have to gain from a greater familiarity with the art and the culture of one of the oldest of all civilizations. And there are relationships now demanding to be born, insisting upon an introduction into our thinking and our political thinking, of the future of our foreign policy. Even as this great exhibition occurs, the more alert, and the warmer sight of what they mean and the concept and the perceptions which they carry with them almost silences our minds in the presence of the mysterious and incalculable possibilities of the artistic spirit. We should remember that that spirit transcends cultural differences just as man should be capable of transcending political differences in the interests of survival and advancement of civilization's future.

Ours is a world society and the people in the east are part of it and if we can't say now that all men are brothers surely we can move toward the hope that we can more nearly be brothers through intercommunication, understanding, tolerance and the opening of new relationships. I think, too, we need to have a new look at our foreign policy. The strength and freedom of our nation depends upon our recognition as an influence in the Pacific, especially since the recent tragic ending of the Indochinese War. The Pacific has always been of first importance to us. We have always been a westward looking nation. Our frontiers now are of the mind and of the spirit rather than geographically, perhaps, but there is still gold beyond the mountains, as Kipling said, in the sense that there's still much more to be learned and to benefit from as we look forward to a new foreign policy concept because the Seventh Fleet alone is not enough to form a foreign policy, important as it is, because force must be restrained and disciplined and organized by doctrine. I believe the Guam Doctrine of 1969 provides the best summary of what our Pacific neighbors may expect from us and we from them, help where we can justify it to our own people, but never again in Asia the intrusion of American forces upon Asian soil. That is an enormously important doctrine that we ought never to lose sight of simply because we have moved from one era of involvement to the era which we hope will become a genuine era of noninvolvement in that sense of the use of our forces in foreign lands. We will keep our treaty commitments of course. We will provide others with nuclear power not only because we must but because if we do not we leave to such nations as Japan the temptation of doing it ultimately for themselves. But in cases involving types of aggression where we furnish forms of assistance, economic or military, I think we should look to nations



directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing for their own defense. I am glad that the forces of decency have overrun the forces of selfishness. I am glad that that temporary spurt of mean spiritedness on the part of some Americans has been largely washed away by public and editorial reaction as to the refugees, and that we recognize that the Statue of Liberty looks both ways. I'm glad that the Congress of the United States voted some 88 to 1 or something to say that we will incorporate these 35,000 "heads of families", with all the jobs that are involved. Most people have forgotten that at the beginning of the depression of 1930 we took in 241,000 people that year and the population was only 65 to 67 percent of the present population. The unemployment was 25% and we still took in a number of refugees. In the last nine years we've taken in Oriental refugees, 717,000 of them. This first outburst, composed I think of a mixture of fear, selfishness and some racism, has been put down. The two senators from California are not of my party. They deserve enormous credit for their courage. I know what they went through. Their mail was 10 to 1 against what they're doing, and they're doing it, and they're supporting the obligation of the United States to care for those who come, storm tossed, to our shores. And yet their people are condemning them for it. I know courage when I see it, and if I have to find it in a couple of Democrats I'll say so.

We have to remember, too, that each of these nations has a separate tradition and destiny in the Pacific and Lee Kuan Yew for whom I hosted a coffee hour this week, the Prime Minister of Singapore, spoke of the different sense of destiny and the different aspirations of each of these Asian countries. He used an old Confucian phrase, Larry, that I'd never heard, "One bed, different dreams." I sensed what he means. One must recognize first the culture, the national viewpoint, the national aspirations of a separate people rather than try to impose our western type of civilization upon them. We must continue to have very strong ties, I think, with the Japanese people. I think the support of the people of South Korea, whom some of us think of, to speak again of whose house I entertained this week — it's been a week of Prime Ministers, they've been meeting in Jamaica and I've had the Tunisian, the Australian, the Moroccan, the South Korean speaker, and the Singaporean, all coming in to discuss Asian problems with our Foreign Relations Committee. And South Korea is particularly concerned for fear that there is a Domino Theory, and nobody knows. I'm not going to argue the matter here, but they are very much concerned as to whether they will be next or not. The Philippines, I think, are justified in taking another look at their relationships. We in America have special ties with the Philippines. They were our dependencies, we sponsored them, we did what Americans have done with their colonies elsewhere in releasing our colonious ties. I was there when the American flag came down over the Philippines and the Philippine flag went up. I know what it is to see sovereignty passed, visibly before your eyes. I know how much we have gained from their friendship but at the same time I now think that in the Philippines, for their own protection, we must not be too critical if they begin to develop a more pre-Asian foreign policy. I do not suggest that these nations are stumbling or that they are humiliating themselves, or that they are going to go Communist. I'm simply saying that each of these nations is bound to review the situation, and is bound to look over its shoulder, and is bound to reflect upon the impact. And most of these Prime Ministers have said to me, "You are not weaker because your tragic and dreadful war is over. You are not weaker, you are stronger." That's what Whitlow, the Labor leader of Australia, said to me. "You are stronger because you don't have that albatross around your neck and you had a setback, but you have not lost respect for the fact that you are still a very great power with enormous potentialities for good as long as you begin to realize the diversity of our problems and our viewpoints." Indonesia, a poor country, temporarily wealthy because of the quadrupling of the price of its oil but otherwise a country poor in resources, an undeveloped country, the most anti-Communist country in Asia, probably, but at the same time also nervous. And I think we need to continue to recognize their fears along with those of Malaysia and Singapore, as I said. And the same with the great subcontinent. Our relations with Australia and New Zealand are in a new phase. We're not



simply Big Brother any more. The generation which started off as having saved that country has moved on. They are themselves very proud not only of their sovereignty but of their Pacific influence and I think we have to recognize that we can't any longer tell them what to do, that we have to ask them to advise with us and consider with us what we can together do. There is another aspect to all that I have been saying. That's the aspect that Pat Moynihan brought up in the March issue of *Commentary* as to the fact that we have lost so much ground among the third world nations in the United Nations, that perhaps we've got to stop apologizing for ourselves. This applies not simply to Asia but to all the third world countries who have consistently been opposing us in the U.N. so that we tend to have only ourselves and Bolivia, and Santo Domingo and Costa Rica, or some other small combination. But Pat Moynihan, who may be our next ambassador to the United Nations for all I know, says in that article that it's time that American spokesmen come to be feared in the U.N. for what they might tell. It's time we ceased to apologize for an imperfect democracy because we cannot find it's equal. Our task, however, is to learn to deal with socialism, pointing out that 47 of the countries of the world are the inheritors of Beatrice and Sidney Webb's socialism, of many decades ago in Great Britain. Most of these countries are not organized on lines of democracy or communism, but a type of early English socialism. We must learn to become neighbors with them, to accept their point of view, but not to permit our point of view about ourselves to be determined by their viewpoint of us, but rather to make clear what we as Americans have to say about our own world, about our concept of ourselves and about our request for our system of government, which we have not very well done recently in the United Nations.

And then, finally, just a couple of thoughts. I think we must continue to accept in China a concept they have given themselves for so long of the great central kingdom. They've always thought of themselves as the center of the universe and there were whole centuries when they had their right to think that. Dr. Sickman talked of the Han dynasty. When one thinks it was the time of Charlemagne in western Europe, when one thinks of the sophistication, and all the subtleties, the great tolerance, and all of the affluence of that society in China as compared with what the western world was seeing at the same time, we have so much to learn from them. We have to learn, too, that in all of these people there is still the concept that they are at the center and we are the circumference. Now we don't have to accept that, but we don't have to fight with them over it either, we simply have to understand it. The great central kingdom. And they still, Chou En Lai still, has to account to his people. The emperor used to make his report to heaven, I don't know how many times a year that was. Once, wasn't it, Larry? Once a year the emperor used to make his annual report to heaven. Chou En Lai has to make his report to the spirit of the Chinese people and our President has to make his State of the Union speech. They're all accountable is what I'm saying. And since they're all accountable we must remember that there is a genius of the people which can make itself felt if we can get across and past the leadership of the peoples to them. That's why I favor so much energy, as much travel to China as possible and I hope to go back before very long myself. I think I've advocated the same thing in the Soviet Union. I've urged them to consider a more open society, to cease their fears of us. I had something to do with the joint Soviet astronaut-cosmonaut flight in space. I'll tell you how it happened. I'm the only American in public office who's ever had the chance to talk to Suslov, the great dialectician. He's the man who thinks up all the awful words they hurl at us at times. In the periods when detente is on the downslide we are the imperialist war mongers, which is the Chinese equivalent of the running dogs of imperialism. Neither side quite means it but they are caught by their semantics. Suslov, the man who thinks of those things, very tall man, double-breasted suit too big for him, looks like a somewhat sardonic and tired Vermont farmer, and yet one of the three or four most powerful men in Russia, and I said to him, "Why don't we try this idea of your cosmonauts and our astronauts taking a space flight together?" And the old fellow thought it over a while and told



through translation, most of them speak English but they'd never let on — it's the same with many Chinese — and said, "No, we've got troubles enough on earth." I was told a year ago that my conversation with Suslov had born fruit. It had the results hoped for. But you see you don't always know and when you're dealing at that level you just don't take no for an answer and you keep working on the maybes until you get them to the perhapses and go on from there. But this is a matter of infinite patience in dealing with difficult people. Now on the human, individual level, if you go to China, if you go to the Soviet Union, if you go to these closed societies, let them know how much respect you have for them as people and how much interest you have for them as people and do your individual part to break down the barriers, because we'll never know which brick it is that pulls out the wall. Thank you.



Ross Terrill and Fred Goodwin



## CHINESE VALUE SYSTEM AND THEIR LINK WITH CONTEMPORARY CHINESE POLICY

ROSS TERRILL

The philosopher Pascal in his "Reflections" wrote, "China obscures, you say — 'tis true but there is light to be found; look for it." Well, we have been looking for light, some of it from beneath the ground, and my aim now is to try and throw light on the question, "Which values lie behind the policies of the Chinese today?"

First — Cultural values. The importance of the length of Chinese tradition. Confucius, Mencius, the Taoist Philosopher Lao-tsze — these three great men of China and others all lived and worked well before the time of Jesus Christ. The Tang Dynasty and the Sung, some of whose achievements we have looked at, both rose and fell before Shakespeare, before Michelangelo, well before the discovery of America.

And there is a great continuity about this civilization. You have heard of the famous exam system whereby Chinese officials were chosen. It was in existence for thousands of years until abolished in 1905. This continuity of the policy of China from ancient times to the early 20th century means that it is a bit as if ancient Greece or ancient Rome were still a continuing force in the world today, with nuclear weapons, as members of the U.N.

The point about this value today is that Chinese politicians do take a long view of things. Mao Tse-tung in a conversation with a great American observer of China, who came from this very area, said, "Mr. Snow, in about a thousand years from now Marx and Lenin will probably appear ridiculous." Well, there aren't many Communists who talk with that time-scale in their mind. After the cultural revolution in China, which was a mixed affair and caused many mixed feelings among the Chinese, Mao said to his colleagues, "We may need four or five more cultural revolutions." In his military thinking, especially for the war against Japan, Mao Tse-tung drew deeply on the military strategy of a man called Sun Tze, who lived about 2500 years ago.

Now today they take the long view. They think their position in Asia will rise, but they don't think they have to rush, and they don't think they are going to have to bring it about all by themselves.

A second cultural value is that the Chinese have always had a concrete way of thinking. They have not been famous for abstract thought or pure science. The aspect I want to stress is what I call a "sense of place" that they have about their own country. The Chinese word for landscape is made up of two words — the first "mountains" and the second "rivers" or "waters", and they often use that term to refer to their nation. For instance, fifty years ago when the Revolution was beginning, there was a society called the Restoration Society, and it required of its members an oath to "restore the Chinese race and recover our mountains and rivers".

The place names in China as you have probably noticed are often by reference to nature. Some of the exhibits came from Honan Province, it means "north of the river", Yunnan Province means "south of the clouds," The City of Hangchow means "place of the boats". Most of the names of Chinese places have this reference to a concrete place to where it stands in relation to the great features of nature.

In the 19th century when the British were battering on the door of China, the Chinese negotiator Prince Kung had a conversation with Lord Elgin of England, and after Elgin explained to Kung a little bit about the British Navy, Kung said, "We had never understood that. We had always assumed that the British had a navy and went all over the world with their boats, simply because England was so small there wasn't enough space for people to live, except on boats".



The Chinese have not had this notion that the Europeans had of going world wide. They are a rooted people with a sense of place. Their dominant philosophy was rather a complacent one, but it was not a missionary one, and I think still today, as Sen. Scott said yesterday, there is in China the notion that people may come to China, more than the notion of China going to the other peoples.

It was not an accident that Mao Tse-tung has only been out of China twice in his life, and until the Revolution of 1949, Mao had never left the mountains and rivers of China. Not an accident that President Nixon went to China, rather than Mao Tse-tung or Chou En-lai coming here. Communism has had an effect on that rooted and continental tradition of China. It has modified it and I will come back in a moment to say a little bit more about how. But my point just now is that the Chinese still have a powerful sense of place, which makes them rather natural isolationists.

Third, the self assurance in the Chinese value system. When the first British envoy came to China to seek an outlet for goods, at the end of the 18th century, the Chinese Emperor said to him, "The celestial empire has all things in prolific abundance; there is no need for the product of outside barbarians."

The Chinese didn't feel in need of trade until the Industrial Revolution of Europe; they were probably ahead of the European countries in what we now call development. They didn't have an industrial revolution and that is why they fell behind. That's why they were no match for the technically and materially superior European culture that arrived on the China coast in the 19th century. But until then, they were leaders.

In the time of Queen Elizabeth I, Francis Bacon remarked that there were three inventions that had done most to shape the world of his day: the magnet, printing and gunpowder. All three of them originated in China. As we see in the Exhibition, there was a fourth that one might add: the compass. And so self-assured were the Chinese on the brink of their catastrophe that in the early 19th century even educated Chinese didn't know where France or England were.

This value of self-assurance has left a strong legacy today. The Chinese are still a self-assured people as they are still a self-contained nation, which by the way, makes it rather absurd to have tried to "contain" China.

East Asia, you see, was the one real holdout against the influence of Western civilization, against the seduction of Western civilization. The Chinese did not come to look up to anything outside China, and even today in the department stores of China the favorite items are not foreign. If Chinese want to give a special treat, they will not think of using the cuisine of France or anywhere else other than their own. The Chinese intellectual, unlike most African intellectuals or South American, does not use the tongue of a European nation or feel it necessary to express himself in any other language but his own.

Fashions from outside don't exist in Peking. Nor do newspapers, much less investments. The Chinese, for better or for worse, still have the sense that they are pretty much sufficient unto themselves. I think you see in the pattern of their society today that value expressed in their rejection of the Russian pattern of Communism. The Chinese threw back the fairly superficial influence of the Europeans in the 19th century. But only in the 1960's did they start to throw back the Russian influence and find a pattern of socialism that would be uniquely Chinese. They are less bureaucratic than the Russians. They are less inclined to say industrialization is the beginning and the end of socialism. And there is more imagination, I believe, and more humor in the Chinese approach to building their socialism than in the Soviet Union.

Finally, among cultural values I would stress the humanism of the Chinese. You will notice in Chinese art an absence of the religious theme — except for ancestors, and that in China pertains more to family than it does to God. Chinese philosophy was generally about social relationships, rather than about relationships between man and infinite things.

We might draw a distinction here between three streams of philosophy. India: very much



supernaturally oriented. The West: an emphasis on conquering of nature for progress. China: an emphasis on how people should relate to each other, in the family and in the extensions of the family that were the Emperor system and other social formations.

There are still echoes of this in China in a number of ways: the family is still very important in the People's Republic of China. In most Chinese families there is at least one grandparent living under the roof. In the countryside, where 80% of the Chinese live, it's almost universal to have grandparents in the household. In the cities, less so, but on the average grandparents are still a big influence on the children. And in the countryside, marriage is still a decision greatly influenced by the views of the elders of the family.

The humanism of the Chinese is expressed in their approach to the relation of men to weapons. You have probably heard of Mao Tse-tung's doctrine that men are more important than weapons. It arose partly because when the Chinese Communist army fought Japan and fought Chiang Kai-shek they didn't have much in the way of weapons. It was a kind of rationalization for their weakness.

But it was more than that. If you read the military writings of Mao Tse-tung, and see there echoes of the past writings of Sun Tze, you find a belief that the mind is decisive in war. Chairman Mao has the idea that you look for the contradictions in the enemy. Even if his technology is superior, to locate the contradictions can be the clue to the weak beating the strong. Has he got advanced trucks and tanks? Look for the contradiction that they are dependent on repair and on fuel. Do what you can to cut off repairs and fuel and you have neutralized his strength. Do they have superior air force? The Chinese say bombing from the air cannot be decisive in warfare, which they believe is ultimately political. The pilots up there can destroy, says Mao, but they can do nothing more than destroy. It's the peasants in the fields down below who will be there when the bombers are gone. And for the political task of making a society down on the earth, the people and not the machines will be supreme.

The Chinese reject the idea of economic growth for its own sake. Here is another echo I think of the humanism of the Chinese tradition. In much of Asia you can see change in economic terms — more automobiles in Bangkok, more signs on the skyline of Taipei, great increase in the size of Manila. In China, there has been tremendous change, but not primarily economic. They have made steady economic progress, but not spectacular economic progress. It is not easy with 850 million people, to have a high rate of growth. The change has been social: in the position of women, the spread of education, the reach of public health, the hyper-organization of local communities under the Communist party.

It is social change and it is psychological change. Students have lost their awe for teachers in today's China. There is a great pride that China has stood up in the world. There is the indoctrination of a controlled press and a controlled theatre to put into the minds of the young the Communist political view of the world. The change is expressed in the idea of "politics in command", and in the idea of "serve the people". Whatever one thinks of this politics, it does have to do with what should be the right order of society. And so China, I suggest, is even today a place where social relations have priority over three other things which are often important in society: over tradition, over economic growth, and over individual ambition.

Now I want to touch on some values that come not from long standing culture, but from the long historical experiences of the Chinese. It was said yesterday that if you know a people's values, you will know their behavior. That is often true — but it is also true that experience brings values, and China's experience since the Opium War of the 1840's has given them indelible values.

One of them is that when they encountered the gun boats and the traders and the missionaries of the Western World they got a burning desire to modernize China. The first reaction was to reject the West, the second was to say, "We will learn some of their techniques, but reject their whole view of life." Neither worked. And the third was to say, "We will reform our society, not just technique, reform it along Western lines." The problem here was that it



was incompatible with Chinese pride. While being assaulted by the West, how could you support the remaking of Chinese society along Western lines?

So the final solution was Communism, which enabled the Chinese to be modern and to be anti-Western, and that is why Communism won in China.

They knew from their encounter with the West, that they must modernize in today's world. But because of their humiliation at the hands of the West, Marxism — a critique of Western society — was the ideal handle for them to use in the task of modernization.

Today in China, one of the real clues to politics is this zeal to modernize the country. It is a great source of argument among the leaders: Money for defense or money for economic development? Here the two great echoes of China's modern historical experience conflict. There is Nationalism, today expressed in hostility to the Soviet Union. Nationalism would seem to require money for defense above all. Yet the desire to modernize would require the money for economic growth. They argue about this in Peking. They also argue about whether to get foreign technology from the United States and Western Europe, as against keeping their garments of socialism pure from the mud that might be found in the alleyways of foreign cultures. So they are trying to modernize, but it comes up against other values, including Nationalism, including China's self-assured culture.

But they don't romanticize their backwardness, as some people have suggested they do, and in thirty years from now, many of the cities of China are going to be like the cities of Japan today. Already on my last visit to Shanghai, I noticed many new signs of modernity. Television plays a big role in the life of the people of China. The motor bike is there; you get drinks and stamps and chopsticks out of machines — all simple but very new to the Chinese. A quarter of a million people in Shanghai are learning English by lessons from the radio.

I must say that the young people of Shanghai — and remember that there are about three hundred million people in China born since the Revolution of 1949 who have no memory of pre-1949 — the young people do not have a very vivid sense of the ancient past of their country. Ancient history has almost been cut out of the curriculums of China. From the Opium War onwards is what is stressed. The young Chinese cannot read the documents of pre-World War I. This is because there was a great linguistic change in China around 1919, when for the first time the Chinese started to write as they speak, instead of in a separate literary form. The young Chinese today, unless he has received special coaching, which he will get only in his home, can hardly read the materials from the long history of China which we have been speaking about. I went to the Ming Tombs near Peking once with some young Chinese officials and one of them said simply, "They would make splendid air raid shelters."

A second value from the modern historical experience touches on the issue of Nationalism which I have broached. It is the value attached to independence. It's the key to China's foreign policy today. In a conversation with Chou En-lai in 1971, Premier Chou, talking to Australians, said: "Beware of your ally, the United States. We had an ally, the Soviet Union, but you can't trust allies."

Chou En-lai made another startling statement. He asked us: "Why is there such a lack of ability in East Europe?" (Politicians are not always so candid with their views.) And he gave his own answer. Because the Russians dominate East Europe and have suppressed the independence and self-reliance of the people.

The Chinese value independence because they knew an awful dependence in the hundred years from the Opium War until the 1940's. They believe in self-reliance because they once were forced to rely on others.

And so it is no surprise that the keynote of China's foreign policy is to resist super powers, because they think super powers compromise the independence of smaller nations, and to back independence movements against the hegemony of the larger force. It is no surprise that their attitude to economic affairs is one of near autarchy. They don't want to be reliant on any single source of supply, they don't want to be reliant on any single market.



Here we have an echo of the distant past, as well as the recent past. The Chinese have the smallest volume of two-way foreign trade per head of any major country. Per head it is about \$10.00 U.S. per person. For many countries it is a hundred dollars or more, for Japan many hundreds of dollars. For all countries of any stature the figure is far higher than that \$10.00 for China. That is to say, they have got a two-way foreign trade of about 8 billion or less and a population of about 850 million. They feed themselves, they're exporting oil, they use largely their own natural resources. In this way they are following an economic policy in harmony with their deep desire to keep their destiny absolutely in their own hands.

And a final value from modern history is that the Chinese feel they must gain equality with the major powers of the world. They were a great civilization, but they lost out to a technically superior one. That loss smoulders inside them in the form of a desire to get equal again; to attain a power fitting to their dignity as a civilization.

A very senior Chinese official once quoted to me with anger a remark that Krushchev was supposed to have made, "These Chinese you know, five of them share one pair of trousers." The Chinese have a lingering memory of the time when they were not equal, and had to sign unequal treaties with civilizations (including Russia) that they believed inferior to their own.

In the 1970's and 1980's we must expect that China will try to match in power terms the other nations of the world. Hence their nuclear weapons — which they are making at least as much for political reasons as for military.

Hence their readiness to be a permanent member of the Security Council. In theory, they favor the abolition of the veto power in the Security Council, yet they have not renounced it and they have used it. And they cannot, I think, hide from themselves a certain satisfaction that they have become one of the Big Five in the U.N., and in a military sense, one of the Big Three.

Here arises a problem for the future of Chinese foreign policy. They want to be a spokesman for the Third World. They want to represent the poor and the dispossessed, the ex-colonies struggling against the super powers. But they have this bomb, and they have that veto power in the U.N., and they have other trappings of a great power. The next generation after Chairman Mao Tse-tung is going to have to struggle with that contradiction.

Finally, a quick reference to a couple of values that spring from the Communist philosophy of the present Chinese government. Universalism. Though Chinese tradition fancied itself to be universal, it was not, I think, universal. The Emperor was called "The Sun of Heaven", his realm was called "The All-Under-Heaven". But of course this was an ethnocentric notion. It was Universalism on Chinese terms. Anyway the Chinese did not make their writ run all-under-Heaven.

But with the Communist philosophy, the Chinese have now got, for the first time a philosophy which is not a Chinese product. They got Marxism and Leninism from Germany and from Russia and there in Tian-an men Square today you can't be but struck at seeing the picture of these two Germans, Marx and Engels, and the two Russians, Lenin and Stalin, in pride of place. You can't but be struck, because it is new for the Chinese.

They have in Communism a philosophy that is meant for all places at all times. You couldn't be a Confucian if you were an illiterate. Arguably you couldn't be a Confucian if you weren't either Chinese or from what we call the Chinese culture area — China, Japan, Vietnam, Korea. You couldn't, I suppose, be a Nazi if you were Black or if you were Jewish. But anyone can be a Communist and the Communist analysis claims to fit the historical development of all cultures and of all continents; and to fit the period of the Shang dynasty and the Chou dynasty and also right up to today and beyond today to the future.

So the coming of the Communism to China has given them this universal handle on analyzing the world and it has given them a global sense (not a global reach, because they don't have the power — we don't know quite what they will do when they do have the power.) They have for the first time in Chinese history — not only the leaders but the ordinary people



— a sense of the whole world. You go into the farms in China and the people will ask you about the Congo, they will give you their opinions of the race questions in the United States. It was unthinkable for Chinese peasants under the dynasties to have any awareness of or interest in social development of the world beyond China.

Now there are tensions here in China. In a nutshell we can say that there are three core ideas that they are trying to juggle with. One is China as a civilization. The second is China as a nation. The third is China as spearhead of international revolution. Number Two is in charge. Chinese policies are based on the view of China as a nation, not as a civilization primarily. For instance, they have told the overseas Chinese to join the local country and even to stop using the Chinese language.

And on international revolution the Chinese have been very prudent. They have told others to be self-reliant as China was self-reliant. However there is a tension, because there are some people in China who would like to see more expression of China as a civilization, and there are some who would like to see more support for international revolution. For instance, in the cultural revolution there were Red guards who said that people of the Chinese race, whether they are in Rangoon or whether they are in Jakarta, should have the right to wear the badge of Chairman Mao and wave the book of Chairman Mao. And as Chou En-lai has recently admitted, the Red Guards wanted to seize Hong Kong. It was Chinese, said the young firebrands, so it should be ruled from Peking. There are, in other words, discordant voices about the priorities between these three core ideas of civilization, nation, and international revolution.

Finally, Communist philosophy gives the Chinese the conviction that history is moving with an inner purpose and that it is moving upwards. This is different from Old China where there was a cyclical view of history. Now it's a linear view, from slave society on to Communism. It is as if you are standing on an escalator and no matter what you do, walk up or down as you may, you are pulled up on this ladder of stages from slave society, through feudalism and capitalism and on to socialism and Communism. It is not the principles of men anymore, at least it is not mostly the principles of men, but the laws of history that will decide the great issues of our time.

This links up with one very old idea in China, the wisdom of taking a long view. The Chinese as Communists have I think blended the long view with the sense of movement of history of Communism and with its optimism. So in today's world they are patient because they are confident that the super powers will not be able to hold down the lesser peoples. They say what matters is not the apparent distribution of power, but who is rising and who is sinking. It's the trend of things, they say, that really matters. There may be many zigs and zags, says Chairman Mao, in the course of the Yellow River, but it is heading toward the sea.

And so they have predicted many things about our world. Fifteen years ago, Chairman Mao said that war brings social change in the direction of the Communist prediction. He said World War I had the effect of putting an end to the feudal empires, the Ottoman, the Hapsburgs, the Czars. World War II, he said, had the effect in Asia of putting an end to the British, French, and Dutch empires. And he said in Vietnam, the U.S. will come up against a brick wall, and it will be a turning point for U.S. relations with Asia. He said, you pick up a rock, but you will drop it on your own foot.

Well, I don't agree that the setback in Vietnam is of that magnitude for the United States, but it is true that the Chinese have become more secure by virtue of a down-turn in American military force in East Asia, and that that down-turn has a lot to do with the Vietnam experience.

My time is up, Mr. Chairman. I have one final remark. I have spoken about the recent past mainly, and I think from the Opium War to now, we can see three stages to keep in mind.

When the West went to China, there was a lot of contact, of interdependence, but the direction was all one way. We were influencing China. The idea was that China had to catch



up with the higher civilization of the West. That more or less came to an end with the Communist revolution, because China turned inward, went her own way. The missionaries went home, the traders went home, the students went home.

We and the Chinese were then two separate worlds. This was a second stage. Mr. Dulles wanted to isolate China and to some extent the Chinese wanted to isolate themselves.

Since the new opening with America and since China's seating in the U.N. a third stage has begun. There is communication again, as our great Exhibit here in Kansas City illustrates. People are going to and fro between ourselves and China. We are again discussing things with the Chinese. The name of a Chinese leader, Mao Tse-tung, and his writings are household words all over the world.

China has entered the world again and yet it's quite different from the first stage. In the interdependence of today and tomorrow, China is not just entering our world, any more than we would be entering China's. We are all being thrust together into a New World.



Groups in discussion following Dr. Terrill's remarks.





Nancy Englander



Ms. Englander's address concludes the conference.



## NEH PUBLIC PROGRAMS

NANCY ENGLANDER

The Chinese exhibition, in a way, is a rather atypical one for the Endowment because of the way it came to us. Normally, as those of you who are familiar with the state-based system know, it is usually an institution or a group of people that approach the, in your case the committee, in our case the Endowment, with a particular proposal in mind. In this case it was the State Department that came to the Endowment to find out if there was a possibility that we might be able to assist in bringing the exhibition to the United States. At that time, as you know, it was for the Nelson Gallery in Kansas City, and now will be seen in San Francisco as well. The Endowment was able to answer affirmatively, with the enthusiastic endorsement of the National Council on the Humanities and our Chairman, for a variety of reasons. One of the reasons is that this exhibition, as Dr. Sickman said yesterday, is not so much an art exhibition as it is an exhibition of cultural history if you will. It is a didactic exhibition. It is an exhibition that provides for the American public insights into a culture that remains very mysterious and relatively unknown. And it was our hope, as has proved to be the case, that the exhibition would become the focus for conferences like this one — scholarly discussions and public programs that would use the exhibition as the jumping off point to explore the historical, philosophical, questions about value systems in China, that would have some relevance today to decisions that as American citizens we are making in our public and private lives. So, the exhibition was something we were very proud to be involved in.

I mentioned public programs as one of the things that we hoped would emerge from sponsorship of the Chinese exhibition, and I would like to talk about public programs for a minute because I think when one thinks about the Endowment for the Humanities one isn't accustomed, particularly those people who aren't close to the state committees, to think about public programs. It is very easy to understand where the education division fits into the humanities, where the fellowship division fits into the humanities, where the research division fits into the humanities. But somehow we think of the humanities in the public as a very innovative idea for a lot of people. And yet the public program division is, I would venture to say, one of the most important. Certainly it receives more than its share of funding from the Foundation on the Arts and Humanities. When Congress established the foundation it was because they recognized, and stated in the founding document, that cultural activities, the arts and humanities, were relevant to not only an understanding of our past, an analysis of our present, but were important to give the American citizen the vision and the wisdom to make decisions that would affect the future. And the way that the humanities can make a contribution to this wisdom, if you will, is by somehow making them public rather than having an ivory tower concept of the humanities which I think many Americans do, resistance to what they can mean in personal terms or a fear of them practically. The Division of Public Programs is dedicated to making the humanities accessible, to making the insight that scholars in the humanities can provide available to increase the variety and the quality of choices that American citizens are forced to make in their public and private lives. It is strongly felt that the humanities have a contribution to make giving us this sense of place and sense of circumstance, that by strengthening our cultural institutions, by encouraging them to include the humanities in their programming, we can expand the presence of the humanities in American life for the general adult public. So, the division intends to do this in many ways. I know that many of you are familiar with the state-based program. I don't know if you are aware that there is a state-based program in each one of the fifty states, each of which is dedicated to bringing scholars in the humanities to bear on public policy issues within that state. You will be surprised, perhaps, to know that there are humanists as well as non-humanists, let's call



them, who resist in a way the fact that there is a public role for a humanist. They are accustomed to a scholarly role and they aren't quite as used to speaking to public policies. The state-based program gives a platform for doing that and it's meeting with increasing success as people become a little more used to the idea.

Another program in the Division of Public Programs which you might not be familiar with is the Media Program. I think that that's a very important one because of the national scope of it, and it is one that tends to bring scholars in the humanities of recognized expertise into collaboration with media professionals — actors, film makers, producers — to produce programs for public broadcasting that have a humanities content to them. I don't know if you've seen the Japanese film festival — that was something that the Endowment for the Humanities was involved in. "The Adams Chronicles" will be forthcoming and we hope will be a very dramatic example of how this kind of collaboration can be productive. There will in the future be programs on public radio where the Endowment for the Humanities will again use scholars in the humanities to give their input to the programs, and we think that this is a very important wedge in bringing the humanities into the daily life of the American citizen.

The third branch of the Division of Public Programs is program development, and this, if you will, is the experimental arm of the Division of Public Programs. It's one which attempts to explore new ways of making the humanities accessible. How can libraries, for example, more effectively reach out to the public with humanities programs? How can adult education, conventional adult education centers, become the bases for humanities programs? That Division is continually evaluating proposals that don't fit into any of the other areas and trying to, at times, initiate and encourage proposals from institutions that might provide a base for this kind of humanities program.

And then we come to the Museums and Historical Organizations program which I mentioned earlier. We have two problems in that program. One is that humanists are not used to having a role in museums very often, and very often museums themselves don't see their mandate or their responsibility to be one that includes the humanities. When we talk about museums and historical organizations we mean all kinds of museums. It is easier to understand, perhaps, the input of a scholar in the humanities for a historical organization or for an archaeological exhibition but we believe that there is equally a role in a fine arts exhibition or in a science exhibition. If, for example, there is going to be an exhibition on man and his environment, then a philosopher might have some very interesting contribution to make that would give that exhibition something that it wouldn't have had if he hadn't been consulted. And so through the museum program we try to encourage applicants to include in their planning consulting with humanists of expertise in the subject matter of the proposed exhibition so that the final exhibition reflects, in the interpretive materials that go along with it, the input of humanist scholars. We're being more or less successful. I think it's going to take a fair amount of time. All of these programs are in the growing stage, and I hope we can expect them to improve rather dramatically. Certainly it's fair to say that the role of museums in American life has changed dramatically. Harry Truman said that he used to visit the museum in Kansas City but that he never told anybody about it because in those days you couldn't admit that you went to a museum without being regarded as some kind of strange bird or another, which he may have been. But certainly when you look at the crowds that are coming to Kansas City for the Chinese exhibition — they say it's 3 to 5,000 people a day who are going through the gallery, they had 8,400 people last Tuesday — it's perfectly clear that something has changed. The Russian exhibition which is at the Metropolitan Museum in New York is averaging 6,000 visitors a day. Strangely enough, an exhibition of Armenian manuscripts that was done by a very small gallery had 72,000 people who came to see an interpretive exhibition on this subject. So, I think we can draw from that the conclusion that people do want to learn. They do want to understand. They're receptive to being brought more in touch with the reality of things. And the public programs of the Endowment are committed



to the idea that scholars in the humanities have a public role that will help people face up to the conditions of life in a way where they as citizens of the world are more able to make fundamental decisions with an insight and a perspective that they would not have had without the humanist influence.

I was going to end this talk at this point because I thought that as a luncheon speaker it's best to be brief and I was told that 10 to 15 minutes for a luncheon speaker was adequate, and then I looked at the program and saw that we were scheduled to go until 2:30, so I'd like to bring up one other thing if you'll bear with me, which is that I happened to look at the discussion session questions and one of the questions is about financial support of the arts and the role of the government, and what should the aim of government support of the arts be. I feel close to this question not only because of my role in the Endowment for the Humanities now but because at the Museum of Modern Arts this was a very pressing issue. As many of you know, cultural institutions in this country are suffering under a severe financial strain that in many instances is crippling them from fulfilling their mandate or their responsibility to the public. In the past, historically not only in this country, there is a history of patronage of the arts be it from the Church, be it from private citizens, a De Medici or a Rockefeller or a Spencer. Private philanthropy working in Europe, as you know, has gone the other route. But government support for museums, for national opera companies, national symphonies, has insured the existence of these institutions. And there's a shift now in the United States because of the financial problems of these institutions so that institutions that at one time resented or resisted the idea of federal support because they were afraid that federal support might mean federal intervention have somehow broadened their point of view and are now actively seeking federal support. I think there isn't an answer yet to where all of this is going but I do think the answer is going to be in a kind of balance which will be perhaps a uniquely American balance that will be private support on one hand, corporate support in the middle let's say, either for altruism or be it for more pragmatic reasons, and government support. And I think that government agencies are trying very hard and I hope succeeding in not interfering with the institutions or the way they would like to do things but rather providing an encouragement and a way for institutions to expand and enhance their programming in a way that is meaningful, and make it possible for these institutions to serve the public role be it for the humanities, be it for the arts, for which they exist.

Thank you.







